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About the Role of Education in  
Swedish Economic Growth, 1867-19951 
Jonas Ljungberg* 
Abstract: Does education cause economic growth, or is it 
the other way around that economic growth causes educa-
tion? Certainly the process is cumulative, yet whether it is 
possible the determine one of the sides as dominant, is a de-
bated issue. This paper explores that relationship for Swe-
den from the early days of industrialization until recently. It 
sketches the expansion of compulsory, secondary and 
higher education. Contrary to previous research concerning 
education in Sweden, no support is found for the hypothesis 
that demography, variations in cohort sizes, can explain 
changes of enrolment in voluntary education. On the basis 
of an analysis of time series, the paper argues that enrol-
ment in higher education has been a causal factor for labour 
productivity in manufacturing, and thereby for economic 
growth, in Sweden since the late nineteenth century. 
I Introduction 
At least since the early years of the discovery of the residual in the growth 
function has part of this residual been attributed to education. More recently for 
example Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have sought to con-
firm such a causality from education to growth for a cross section of countries 
in the post-war period. However, other findings query if not the causality might 
run in the other direction, from economic growth to more education.  
                                                          
1  I am indebted to participants at workshops and seminars in Helsinki, Montpellier, and 
Cologne, and in particular Susanna Fellman, Claude Diebolt, and Rainer Metz, for critical 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Remaining curiousities are my own. The re-
search on the Swedish education sector has been financed by the Bank of Sweden Tercen-
tenary Foundation. The author is associate professor at the Department of Economic His-
tory (Lund University).  
*  Address all communications to Jonas Ljungberg, Department of Economic History (Lund 
University), P.O. Box 7083, S-22007 Lund. E-mail: jonas.ljungberg@ekh.lu.se 
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That is the presumption of Diebolt and Monteils (2000) from an analysis of 
long-term data for Germany. Re-visiting the post-war cross country data set, 
used by Barro and others, Bils and Klenow (2000) confirm the correlation 
between schooling enrolment in 1960 and the subsequent economic growth, but 
claim that the main direction of causation was from economic growth to educa-
tion. Basically their argument is that countries with high enrolment in 1960 did 
not display a faster subsequent growth in human capital or technology why 
these factors should have contributed less to economic growth. However, one 
may also hold that since it is the stock of human capital that affect economic 
growth, it is the level and not the rate of change that is relevant in this perspec-
tive. 
Moreover, it is ambiguous to draw conclusions about the nature of causation 
from cross-sectional data. Causation considers time and should be analysed as 
historical processes, whether from time series of quantitative data or more 
qualitatively. A comparative approach is certainly superior if one looks for 
general conclusions, yet the aim of the present paper is more limited. It takes a 
look at the connection between Swedish economic growth, or more specifi-
cally, the growth of labour productivity in manufacturing, and the expansion of 
education since the last third of the nineteenth century.  
Even if there is a broadly shared view that human capital is important for the 
long term economic performance, as argued by, for example, Lars Sandberg 
(1978, 1982), it is not quite obvious why. Such a positive role of human capital 
has also been disputed with the assertion that Taylorism and Fordism have de-
skilled labour during the twentieth century (Braverman 1974). It could thus 
seem as if a complementarity between technology and skills, or human capital, 
is a recent phenomenon, originating in the third industrial revolution and com-
puterization. However, as Goldin and Katz (1998) point out in an important 
article, the technology-skills complementarity can be traced back in history. 
The technology of the second industrial revolution around the turn of the cen-
tury 1900 presupposed not only mass production workers, with less skills, but 
also workers that managed installation and maintenance of the new manufac-
turing technology. These latter workers must have more skills, and Goldin and 
Katz (2001) associate the expansion of high schools in the U.S. during the 
period 1910-1940 with the growth of the related industries. 
Yet, it can be doubted that the distinction between production work and in-
stallation-maintenance work bears all the way to explain the complementarity 
between technology and skills. The Swedish industry thus shows an alternating 
pattern between periods when relatively more skilled labour, and periods when 
relatively more un-skilled labour, has been in demand (Schön 1994, 1998). For 
example, this pattern can explain the variations in the speed of the reduction of 
the gender gap in wages of manufacturing over the period 1913-1990 (Svens-
son 1995). According to this hypothesis, the weight of the technology-skills 
complementarity should be related to the long swings in Swedish economic 
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development. During phases of transformation and structural change relatively 
more skilled labour has been required, not only for installation and mainte-
nance but for new tasks in different sectors and at different levels of the econ-
omy. Such phases have characterized about twenty year long periods, inter-
rupted by equally long phases dominated by stability and rationalization. Dur-
ing these rationalization phases, the demand for skilled labour has slackened 
whereas the demand for unskilled labour has increased.  
The long swings might explain the variations in earnings differentials be-
tween white collar and blue collar labour, although the variations over most of 
the twentieth century have moved around a trend of diminishing differentials 
(Ljungberg 2000). Thus there should be different forces at work, exposed on 
the one hand in the about twenty year long swings, and on the other hand as a 
secular trend of a diminishing premium on grades of human capital. The trend 
could be taken as an argument for the Braverman thesis, but a more fruitful 
reasoning was presented by Tinbergen (1975). Taking account of the technol-
ogy-skills complementarity he perceived the income distribution as an outcome 
of a race between technology and education, and found that over the long-term 
it had been won by education. Thus, the increased demand for skills has been 
outgrown by the expansion of education that has more than proportionally 
increased the supply of skills. 
The reasoning started above with the impact of human capital on productiv-
ity, and turned to a discussion of earnings differentials. The connection is of 
course the presumption that earnings reflect productivity. The long-term 
growth of productivity has resulted in an increase of earnings, relatively most 
for blue collar labour which also could be seen as an increase in the general 
level of human capital. The total stock of human capital is influenced both by 
the general level of the labour force and of the amount of specialists in the 
labour force. Education, measured for example through enrolment, add to the 
stock of human capital and it is reasonable to believe that a larger contribution 
will show up with a time lag as an increase in the growth of productivity, as 
well as reductions later on will result in slower productivity growth.  
However, an increase in productivity may also have an effect on earnings 
and if human capital is relatively better remunerated, then education will seem 
more attractive and an increase in enrolment of voluntary education will fol-
low. Thus a cumulative process will evolve. If there has been such a process in 
twentieth century Sweden, and if it is possible to disentangle which factor, 
productivity or enrolment, that has had the upper hand, is the issue below.  
The limitation to productivity should be motivated briefly. The rate of 
change in GDP is the measure of economic growth, yet GDP is a big aggregate 
influenced both by the quantity of inputs in production, their quality as well as 
their composition.  Education is assumed to have an impact on the quality of 
labour, either through increasing the level of human capital within a given 
composition of the economic sectors, or in combination with structural change 
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that increases the knowledge intensive sectors. Accordingly, education should 
influence labour productivity. Due to measurement problems and data con-
straints, productivity here is confined to blue collar labour in manufacturing for 
which Swedish data are available since 1890 (Schön 1990b). 
One might, of course, dispute the impact of education on human capital as 
too a narrow comprehension, restricted as it is to the individual, and claim that 
education has a much broader influence on society. Education  thus has an 
influence on social capital and thereby a more compound influence on what 
Abramowitz denominated social capability for economic growth.2 Here we 
approach, however, what earlier economic historians discussed as differences 
in culture which cannot, regardless of their importance, be captured in quantita-
tive terms. In the final analysis, though, education should have an impact on 
productivity, whether conveyed through human or social capital or culture. The 
limitation to productivity therefore seems reasonable. 
The next section of the paper draws a quick outline of the expansion of edu-
cation in Sweden, and relates it to demographic change. The third section ex-
plores the relationships between enrolment in education and productivity in 
manufacturing. Some econometrics is used, yet presented with the aim to make 
both the data and the analysis more transparent also for less technical readers. 
Section five concludes the paper. 
II. Expansion of education in Sweden 
It is well known that literacy was high already before industrialization in Scan-
dinavia. Moreover, recent research emphasizes that the ability to write was 
important for the commercialization of agriculture that preceded industrializa-
tion (Nilsson, Pettersson and Svensson1999).  
Superficially this seems to confirm the Sandberg thesis. According to Sand-
berg (1982), however, Sweden was an “impoverished sophisticate” by mid-
nineteenth century, and first during industrialization the extravagance of liter-
acy bore fruit. Yet, both views share the emphasis on human capital even if 
they date the onset of economic development differently. 
The early literacy had not its origin in compulsory schools. In Sweden there 
was a tradition of domestic schooling and it also took several decades after the 
introduction of compulsory school in 1842, before the great majority of chil-
dren went to school more than casually. In  the 1870s compulsory school was 
extended from four to six classes. This marked the breakthrough of primary 
schools in Sweden, as exposed by its rapidly increasing share in GDP (see 
figure 1).  
                                                          
2  Abramowitz (1986, 1995). About the expansion of secondary education and social capital 
in the U.S.A., see Goldin and Katz (2001). 
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Note: The contribution is measured as the sum of salaries and investments 
while expenditures on intermediary costs are excluded. Investments 1867-1917 
are provisionally extrapolated from their proportion to salaries in 1918-23. The 
data used here and elsewhere in this paper will be made available in Ljungberg 
(forthcoming). 
Figure 1 displays the contribution of compulsory education to GDP as conven-
tionally measured, that is, at factor cost. Thus it is the sum of salaries and of 
investments, whereas books and other intermediate costs are excluded. Com-
pulsory school first included only primary schools, yet with the passing of time 
lower secondary school, that is, classes 7-9, also became included. Around 
1870 four years in primary school were the norm, extended to six years a dec-
ade later, and seven years in the interwar period. After World War II compul-
sory school was successively extended and in 1970 everyone spent nine years 
in school. 
There are three components behind the increase of primary, or compulsory, 
education in GDP. One is the increase in the length of schooling as just out-
lined, provided that schools were given more resources. Schools can be given 
more resources for other reasons, for example, when teachers’ salaries are 
elevated, and if that increase is larger than the percentage growth of GDP, the 
share in GDP will increase. However, that is only the case when current prices 
0.01
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0.03
0.04
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Share of GDP
(left scale)
Real cost per student
(right scale)
Figure 1 : Contribution of primary schools to GDP, share in current prices, 
and cost per pupil, thousand crowns in constant prices of 1910/12 , 
five year centered moving averages. 
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are used, since when measured in constant prices the elevation of salaries will 
not show up as an increase of resources. The third component is demographic 
change which influences the quantity of throughput in education.  
The series showing the cost per student in Figure 1 is also composed of in-
vestments and labour cost, whereas intermediate consumption is omitted. 
Moreover, that series has been deflated into constant prices (of 1910/12) and 
divided by the number of students in compulsory school. Even if the similari-
ties between to two curvatures strike the eye, there also are important differ-
ences which inform about the components in the development. Compulsory 
schooling as a share of GDP increased significantly in the 1870s and 1880s, 
and around 1920, without a corresponding change in real cost per student. At 
the first instance there was a rapid increase of the number of teachers as well as 
of teachers’ salaries. Real cost per student increased only slowly, according to 
the longer trend, since due to the lengthening of compulsory schooling, enrol-
ment increased almost correspondingly. The second rapid increase in the share 
of GDP, is explained by the fact that teachers’ salaries more than trebled 1917-
1920, whereas GDP, in nominal terms, not even doubled. However, the in-
crease in real cost per student is much less dramatic, in these years, since the 
blow-up of nominal salaries is nullified when converted to constant prices.  
From 1920 to 1944 the two series move in opposite directions, and the di-
vergence is explained by the decrease in fertility in the interwar period. Note 
that the real cost per student accelerated a couple of years before the cohort 
sizes changed the trend of the share in GDP, thus indicating a political will of 
the time to spend on schooling. Note also the concomitant drop in both series 
during the first half of the 1970s, this time indicating a political will to save 
money instead of letting the, already passed, ease of demography enhance 
investments in human capital. Between 1970 and 1975 the volume of invest-
ments (in constant prices) in the infrastructure of compulsory schooling was 
halved. The latter part of the 1970s saw a recovery, but again in the 1980s, 
when the transformation of the third industrial revolution demanded more 
human capital, school investments fell and also labour input stagnated.   
As far as compulsory education is concerned, there was a secular expansion 
that was faster than the economic growth. Over the whole period, from 1867 to 
1990, compulsory education increased from less than 0.5 percent of GDP to 2.6 
percent. Yet, the highest share, 3.4 percent, was reached in 1978 and the fol-
lowing decrease was only partly due to smaller cohort sizes. If we apply yet 
another measure of compulsory education and adjust the share in GDP for 
student numbers, the peak actually occurred already in 1969. Measured in that 
way, more than the whole expansion took place during three periods: 1874-
1888, 1917-1921, and 1961-1969. It is a remarkable fact that the expansion of 
education, over what can be explained by a proportional growth in GDP and by 
population growth, occurred during three short periods together embracing 
three decades, during a period of twelve decades. 
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  Source: Computations from Wilmoth (2001). 
Figure 2 highlights the demographic component in the expansion of education. 
Although cohort sizes increased up to the interwar period, bad harvests in the 
late 1860s had caused a demographic setback that around 1880 resulted in a 
decrease of those aged 7 to 14. It was precisely in these years when primary 
education was given more resources and enrolment substantially expanded.   
After 1920 a sharp drop in fertility reduced numbers aged 7 to14 with almost 
30 percent until 1945. The post-war demography exhibited a cyclical pattern 
with two peaks, for those aged 7 to14 in 1958 and 1979.  
Figure 3 adds to the picture by giving the enrolment ratios for primary, sec-
ondary, and higher education. Here primary education is homogenously de-
fined, including lower secondary schools and classes up to ninth year that be-
came compulsory in the post-war period. However, enrolment adequately 
should be compared with cohorts up to 16 and not just to 14. That is why the 
primary ratio is hovering between 130 and 133 percent from 1970 onwards. 
Two periods of expansion fall out: in the 1870s, and from the 1930s to 1970. 
As regards the effects on the cost of education, the latter period of expansion 
initially counteracts the demographic decline, and then in the post-war period 
reinforces the demographic increase. 
Furthermore, it is notable that the trend of enrolment in higher secondary 
education bends upward in 1930, while the take off for higher education had to 
wait until 1950. These breaks of trends cast doubt on the Easterlin effect. Ac-
cording to the Easterlin effect, the more intense competition for careers in 
400000
600000
800000
000000
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Age 7-14
Age 15-19
Age 20-25
Figure 2 : Cohort sizes, number of persons in three age groups 1867-
1995. 
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bigger cohorts induces higher enrolment in education, and the lesser competi-
tion within smaller cohorts should lead to lower enrolment (Easterlin 1987, 
Ohlsson 1986).  
A comparison with Figure 2 actually indicates that the age group relevant 
for higher secondary education started a long decline about 1930, and that the 
age group relevant for higher education was still on decline in 1950. It might be 
that the discussion has too much focussed on the very conspicuous expansion 
of education in the later post-war period, when the huge breeds of the 1940s 
entered secondary and higher education. Despite decreasing cohort sizes, how-
ever, enrolment in higher secondary education accelerated from 1930 and in 
higher education from 1950. 
Around 1970 enrolment found a plateau, yet in the later 1980s expansion re-
sumed, in particular of higher education. From 1988 to 1995 enrolment in 
higher education increased from 23 to 40 percent, and from 52 to 61 percent in 
higher secondary education. The definition of higher education became broader 
than previously from 1977 onward, and several programmes that previously 
were defined as vocational training became administered by university col-
leges. This change of definition actually hides a part of the decrease in tradi-
tional higher education during the 1980s. So even if there was a substantial 
0.8
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1.2
1.4
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Primary: 7-14
(left scale)
Higher: 20-25
0.005
0.02
0.1
Secondary: 15-19
(Right scale)
Figure 3 : Enrolment ratios in primary, higher secondary, and 
higher education. 
Note : Definitions, see text!
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increase in enrolment after 1988, it started from a lower level than shown in 
figure 3.  
A quantitatively important group, yet difficult to define, that has been ex-
cluded from higher education, as defined here, is students at the public school 
teachers’ colleges (seminarier). Before World War II these teachers normally 
graduated about an age of 22, after entering the college at 18 without any pre-
vious secondary education. Before 1920, the size of this group corresponded to 
30 percent of the students in other higher education, declining to 20 percent in 
the interwar period and a mere 4.4 percent in 1942. This decline was obviously 
an effect of the reduced number of pupils in primary school, caused by the 
interwar fertility decline. The new expansion of primary education led also to a 
boom for the teachers’ seminars. In 1949 their numbers corresponded to 40 
percent of the students in other higher education. Were they included in the 
enrolment in higher education, the trend of enrolment would have bent already 
in 1945, thus reinforcing the critical argument above about the Easterlin effect. 
To summarize: Compulsory education had a short period of expansion in the 
1870s and 1880s, and a long expansion from the late 1930s to 1970. Higher 
secondary education expanded in four decades from 1930, and higher educa-
tion in two decades from 1950. The 1970s and 1980s were a period of stagna-
tion. In the late 1980s expansion resumed in higher secondary and higher edu-
cation, though investments or expenditures are not considered. 
III. Does education increase productivity? 
The basic problem addressed here is the interrelation between productivity in 
manufacturing, which has been an important component in Swedish economic 
growth, and the expansion of education, measured as enrolment. The aim is, 
however, not to build a full-fledged model that can make a quantitative esti-
mate of the contribution of education to productivity change but a more modest 
one. Such an estimate must be based in an assumption about causality and the 
aim is, precisely, to explore the relation between education and productivity 
and to identify the possible main direction of causation. 
If there is any causal interrelation, one should expect one of two types of 
correlation. Either will productivity change systematically show up a certain 
period after a similar change in enrolment, when the former students are inte-
grated in the labour force. This may indicate that education causes economic 
growth. Or, on the contrary, will changes in enrolment systematically show up 
a certain period after a similar productivity change, indicating that economic 
growth fosters expansion of education. There may also be a cumulative process 
with both sides acting as cause and effect, either with one side persistently 
dominating or with the dominating side changing over time. 
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Table 1. Granger tests on productivity of blue collar labour in manufacturing 
and enrolment in education, 1890-1990 
Null Hypothesis: 
(G.C.=Granger cause) 
Period Lags: 3 yrs
 P-value 
Lags: 5 yrs 
P-value 
Lags: 7 yrs
P-value 
Lags: 9 yrs
P-value 
Lags:11yrs 
P-value 
E714 does not g.c. P 1890-1990 0.0981 0.2576 0.3006 0.2405 0.3418 
“”” 1890-1940 0.0450 0.1078 0.2659 0.1572 0.0985 
“”” 1950-1990 0.0002 0.0011 0.0002 0.0005 0.0039 
P does not g.c. E714 1890-1990 0.5465 0.6836 0.8508 0.8884 0.8523 
“”” 1890-1940 0.1991 0.1428 0.5812 0.7344 0.9062 
“”” 1950-1990 0.0025 0.0015 0.0069 0.0074 0.0057 
E1519 does not g.c. P 1890-1990 0.0179 0.0476 0.1103 0.1956 0.2144 
“”” 1890-1940 0.9383 0.8933 0.0640 0.2814 0.6786 
“”” 1950-1990 0.0062 0.0539 0.1522 0.1178 0.3060 
P does not g.c. E1519 1890-1990 0.7820 0.2398 0.2991 0.4904 0.7649 
“”” 1890-1940 0.0732 0.1764 0.1452 0.0146 0.0417 
“”” 1950-1990 0.4087 0.1022 0.1038 0.2249 0.4522 
E2025 does not g.c. P 1890-1990 0.0003 0.0016 0.0045 0.0097 0.0581 
“”” 1890-1940 0.0119 0.0083 0.0299 0.0771 0.1323 
“”” 1950-1990 0.0002 0.0007 0.0026 0.0173 0.0725 
P does not g.c. E2025 1890-1990 0.5883 0.6310 0.9178 0.7259 0.5035 
“”” 1890-1940 0.0830 0.3105 0.8360 0.5934 0.6667 
“”” 1950-1990 0.9430 0.9965 0.9825 0.9971 0.6452 
 
Note: E714 stands for school enrolment among those aged 7 to 14 years; E1519 
those aged 15 to 19 and enrolled in higher secondary education; E2025 those 
aged 20 to 25 and enrolled in higher education. P stands for productivity of 
blue collar labour in manufacturing. All series are logged. 
One simple way of finding if there is any such lagged pattern in pairs of time 
series is the Granger test. Provided that there is some path dependency in a 
time series, say enrolment in education, current values can be regressed on 
preceding values. The Granger test adds also the preceding or lagged values of 
another time series, say productivity, and indicates if these significantly add to 
the explanation of enrolment. Table 1 reports Granger tests on the logged val-
ues of enrolment in education and of labour productivity in manufacturing with 
different time lags and for different periods. The figures are the probabilities 
that the lagged values of the other series do not add to the explanation, and a 
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figure of 0.05 means that the lagged correlation can be established with the 
conventional statistical significance of 95 percent. The Granger test says noth-
ing about real causality but it may explore a time pattern that can reject, or fail 
to reject, causality. In the latter case there is said to exist a “Granger causality” 
which remains to be theoretically explained. 
Another finding is that there was a mutual “Granger causality” between en-
rolment in compulsory education and productivity change during the second 
half of the twentieth century. Probabilities are very strong in both directions, 
though possibly stronger from education to productivity than the reverse. What 
can be concluded from this econometric finding? We know that compulsory 
school was prolonged from seven to nine years during the first two decades of 
this period whereupon enrolment found a plateau (see figure 3), and we also 
know that economic growth and productivity change slowed down from 1975. 
The Granger test in this case just seems to confirm what we already knew. 
Concerning secondary education results are also weaker, yet indicate a 
“Granger causality” from enrolment to productivity change though not for the 
half century before 1940. An important conclusion from the tests, is that pro-
ductivity change has followed upon change of enrolment in higher education 
throughout the twentieth century, and during the second half also upon change 
in enrolment in secondary education. 
A further time series analysis shows that enrolment in secondary as well as 
in higher education are cointegrated with productivity in manufacturing, ac-
cording to a standard test (Johansen). In other words, there are long-term trends 
in these series, yet there persists a constant relation between them, or, more 
precisely, variations around a constant relation. Assuming that these variations 
are movements around an equilibrium, econometrics prescribe that such rela-
tions should be analysed with an error-correction model. However, it seems to 
me that the information obtained from such a model will be based too much on 
short term behaviour, due to its reliance on first differences or annual change. 
I have therefore proceeded in another way. The series have been detrended 
through subtraction from their quadratic trend. That reduced but did not com-
pletely erase the trends – there remained weak unit roots in the series. A 
graphical inspection, as in Figure 4, also shows the similar swings in productiv-
ity and enrolment, in particular when productivity is compared with higher 
education. It is clear that the series follow a similar pattern but from the graphi-
cal inspection it is not possible to judge if there are any systematic leads and 
lags. The Granger tests indicate that changes of enrolment in higher education 
have preceded productivity change and now it will be seen if the detrended 
series, where the swings are more emphasized, support or reject that result. 
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Regressions were run with enrolment in secondary and higher education, re-
spectively, and productivity changing place as X and Y: 
Yt = constant  + β1Xt-3 +β2Xt-5 
That is, the detrended productivity series was regressed on enrolment in educa-
tion three and five years earlier, and the reverse, enrolment was regressed on 
lagged values of productivity. Table 2 reports the results. At first sight it seems 
as if enrolment in higher education can explain 36 percent of the variation in 
productivity, and that the five-year lagged variable is clearly significant. How-
ever, as shown by the low Durbin Watson statistics, there is high autocorrela-
tion, systematic variations that are not explained, maybe produced by the re-
maining unit root. A standard procedure to handle autocorrelation can be to add 
an autoregressive variable – which here produces brilliant R2 –values and 
cleans up most of the autocorrelation ( the desired Durbin Watson statistics 
should be in the range 1.7-2.3 when there are three independent variables and 
100 observations). However, also the five-year lagged enrolment loses its prob-
ability and all that remains is an autoregressive explanation. The same pattern 
is repeated when secondary enrolment, as well as higher education, are re-
gressed on productivity. Only productivity regressed on enrolment in higher 
education, as seen from regressions (5) and (6), survive with acceptable prob-
abilities when the autoregressive term is added. In this case we may conclude 
that the significance of the coefficients are not a spurious result of the autocor-
relation. The exercise thus seem support the result of the Granger test: The 
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980
Productivity
Enrolment
Figure 4 : Labour productivity in manufacturing and enrolment in 
higher education of 20 to 25 year old: residuals from quad-
ratic trend, 1890-1990 
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hypothesis that higher education was a causal factor in Swedish economic 
growth during  the century 1890-1990 cannot be rejected.    
Table 2. Regressions with productivity and enrollment in education, 1890-1990 
Dependent 
variable 
(regr. no.) 
constant Indep. variable 
(lag) 
Indep. variable 
(lag) 
AR(1) Durbin 
Watson 
Adjusted 
R2 
P 
(1) 
 
-0.0078 
(P: 0.438) 
E1519(-3) 
0.1229    (P: 0.273) 
E1519(-5) 0.2450    
(P: 0.030) 
--  
0.19 
 
0.36 
P 
(2) 
 
-0.0190 
(P: 0.813) 
E1519(-3) 
0.0862    (P: 0.189) 
E1519(-5)  -0.0703   
(P: 0.287) 
 
0.9515 
(P:0.000) 
 
1.43 
 
0.91 
E1519 
(3) 
 
-0.0088 
(P: 0.666) 
P(-3) 
1.3364    (P: 0.000) 
P(-5)          -1.0010   
(P: 0.006) 
--  
0.15 
 
0.12 
E1519 
(4) 
 
-0.2113 
(P: 0.524) 
P(-3) 
0.2319    (P: 0.181) 
P(-5)          -0.2288  
(P: 0.183) 
 
0.9728 
(P:0.000) 
 
1.56 
 
0.92 
P 
(5) 
 
-0.0028 
(P: 0.701) 
E2025(-3) 
0.2321    (P: 0.024) 
E2025(-5) 0.1656    
(P: 0.093) 
-- 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.66 
P 
(6) 
 
0.0059 
(P: 0.816) 
E2025(-3) 
0.2409    (P: 0.003) 
E2025(-5) 0.1782    
(P: 0.028) 
 
0.8562 
(P:0.000) 
 
1.52 
 
0.92 
E2025 
(7) 
 
-0.0203 
(P: 0.325) 
P(-3) 
1.5751    (P: 0.000) 
P(-5)          -0.6065   
(P: 0.092) 
-- 
 
 
0.14 
 
0.29 
E2025 
(8) 
 
-0.1590 
(P: 0.441) 
P(-3) 
0.1570    (P: 0.235) 
P(-5)          -0.1105   
(P: 0.401) 
 
0.9726 
(P:0.000) 
 
1.38 
 
0.96 
 
Note: Detrended series as explained in the text.  
IV. Conclusion 
Industrialization was a long process but the breakthrough of modern industry in 
Sweden started about 1890. It is reasonable to assume that the expansion of 
primary education a decade earlier paved the ground for the rapid development 
that encompassed, more or less, all sectors of the society. The present explor-
ative analysis of enrolment in education and productivity change has not, how-
ever, been able to justify that assumption. Nor has the hypothesis been rejected; 
the employed tools may be too coarse. On the other hand, for the postwar pe-
riod a double directed relation was found for enrolment in compulsory educa-
tion and productivity, and the relation between education and growth may be 
seen as fundamentally a cumulative process. 
Yet, considering secondary and higher education changes in enrolment pre-
ceded productivity change during the whole century and in particular during 
the second half.  This pattern is more unambiguous for higher than for secon-
dary education. Productivity change, and economic growth, can therefore not 
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be said to have caused expansion of secondary education. The opposite causa-
tion, from secondary and higher education, though, seems reasonable. 
The analysis here has been pursued at a rather aggregate level, both as re-
gards productivity data and enrolment. A task for further research is to look at 
different specialist education and also to look for other measures of economic 
performance than productivity in manufacturing. Then it may be possible to 
disentangle between the role of general education, and specialist and vocational 
education, respectively. Even more desirable is that such research could be 
performed in comparative perspective, since only if the same time patterns 
appear in different countries general conclusions can be drawn. 
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